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discussed in turn. From the standpoint of the persecutions, Dr. Case inclines to the view that First Peter was written in the reign of Trajan and during the early days of Pliny's régime as governor of Bithynia. Then it must be regarded as a pseudonymous or anonymous work. But he allows that this result is not certain, because the date cannot be determined apart from the vexed question of authorship. The two are bound up together, and the verdict is *non liquet*. Probably this is the wisest as well as the safest conclusion that can be reached in this perplexing matter. Second Peter is held—rightly in the opinion of the reviewer—to be a pseudepigraphon belonging to "that body of literature which grew up around the name of Peter (*Gospel, Preaching, Apocalypse*) about the middle of the second century" (p. 208*b*). Asia Minor is favored as the place of composition.

The authors of the articles represent various points of view, and they sometimes express different opinions on the same question. For example, Dr. Stalker holds that the Pastoral Epistles were written by Paul near the end of a long life (pp. 143*b* f.); whereas Dr. R. A. Falconer, on account of certain notable similarities between these epistles and the Lucan writings, thinks that Luke "had a large share" in the composition of the Pastorals (p. 593*b*). Such differences of opinion are inevitable, and they will serve to stimulate study and thought on the part of discriminating readers.

Dr. Hastings and the learned men who have collaborated with him are to be congratulated on the completion of a large and exacting task. They have produced a useful and scholarly work of reference. Moreover, the editor's object has been attained; for the *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* and the *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, each in two volumes, form together "a complete and independent Dictionary of the New Testament."

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THEOLOGY AMONG THE SCIENCES

Nothing is more needed today than the endeavor described by the title of Professor Macintosh's latest book.¹ Our age is becoming more and more accustomed to what is known as the "empirical" method of discovering what ought to be believed on any subject. There is

¹ *Theology as an Empirical Science*. By Douglas Clyde Macintosh. New York: Macmillan, 1919. xvi+270 pages. \$2.00.

widespread uncertainty and hesitation concerning religious beliefs because these have not been presented in a way to be convincing to those who are touched by the scientific spirit. If theological beliefs can be set forth by a method of inquiry similar to that employed in constructing the doctrines of the sciences, much perplexity and paralysis of effort will be prevented on the part of the present generation of thoughtful students.

It is true that for some time theologians have appealed to "experience" as the source for theology, hoping thus to avoid the appearance of begging the entire question, as would be the case in a simple reproduction of "authoritative" doctrines. But "experience" is a vague word; and Professor Macintosh rightly feels that a theology which simply transcribes the content of selected experiences is too subjective to rank as a genuine science. Science is concerned, not to describe experience, but to set forth an accurate knowledge of the objective reality which we experience. When a theology contents itself with the exposition of "values" or "experiences," it "assumes not only that something which ought to be *believed* for some particular purpose, therefore ought to *be*; it goes on to assume that this which *ought* to be, therefore *is*. Herein lies its dogmatism" (p. 24).

In other words, Professor Macintosh proposes that theology shall be just as realistic as are the sciences which interpret the physical world. Not the *ideas* of religion, but the real *object* of religious faith should be described, and the laws which govern its activity should be ascertained. Just as the physicist may define the character of, say, electricity, so that we may know how to adjust ourselves to this reality in order to secure the benefits of electricity in our life, so the theologian is to define the character of God, in order that we may know how to make the proper religious adjustments of our life to this reality, and thus attain "salvation." Such an undertaking, if successful, will enable God and the plan of salvation to be presented as objective realities to which life must be adjusted.

This is precisely what orthodox theology does. But it bases its realistic conception of God on certain objective physical facts, viz., miracles, the incarnation, and the supernaturally produced Scriptures. These realistic historical foundations afford evidence of the actual existence and activity of God. Professor Macintosh recognizes that wherever we are dealing with historical matters, the empirical sciences must be permitted to pass judgment. And the verdict of these sciences is decidedly damaging to the realistic assumptions of orthodoxy. We

cannot be sufficiently sure of the reality of physical miracles to base any argument on them. Critical study of the Scriptures has shown them to be "religious experience" rather than dictated divine doctrines. A scientific theology, it seems, undermines orthodox realism.

How then are we to avoid falling into the subjectivism of an appeal to "experience"? The solution appears in the following words:

But there is one presupposition which is peculiar to empirical theology, just as there is always one presupposition in every empirical science which is the special presupposition of that science. The empirical sciences assume the existence, and the possibility of empirical knowledge, of the objects they undertake to investigate. Thus chemistry assumes the existence of matter; psychology, the existence of states of consciousness; psychology of religion, the existence of religious experience, and so on. In each case there is assumed, commonly on the basis of pre-scientific experience, the accessibility of the object to further knowledge through further experience. And what is true of the other sciences is true of empirical theology. . . . Ordinarily the empirical theologian, it may be expected, will posit the existence of God—defined, to be sure, in preliminary fashion—because he is already practically sure, on the basis of religious experience, that God really exists. If it be objected that this is dogmatic, the reply is that it is dogmatic only as every empirical science is dogmatic; it is not dogmatic in any unscientific sense [pp. 28 and 29].

Granting the parallelism suggested in the above, the crucial question arises as to whether theology has any such critical technique for investigating the "object" of its presuppositions as have the empirical sciences. What becomes of "matter" in the theories of chemistry? Does it not actually disappear from the chemist's vocabulary? Is it not analyzed into factors in such a way as to supersede the entity "matter"? So, too, the "states of consciousness" of psychology and the "religious experience" of the psychology of religion are left behind in the course of the scientific examination. They are too crude, too undifferentiated, to serve as actual "objects."

But Professor Macintosh, having postulated the real existence of God in this practical fashion, proceeds in his theology to retain the original object as the sufficient material for scientific procedure. Now the only technique which he possesses for the further examination of the content of this object is found in that very religious experience which, by hypothesis, would leave us with a subjective exposition. As a matter of fact, his content of doctrine consists in a careful and frank exposition of the *modifications of the ideas* of God, Christ, salvation,

and the like which are finding expression in modern religious experience. But the ideas themselves are simply those delivered by traditional theology. To find an "empirical" theology discussing the "aseity" of God (see p. 181) leads one to wonder where the limits of empiricism lie.

Professor Macintosh's theology is empirical, in the sense that he is eager to test all beliefs by a rational examination of the actual experience of men. But the beliefs which he accepts for this testing are the standard doctrines which were worked out in the Christianity of past centuries, and were formulated with the aid of a type of metaphysics which modern empirical science repudiates. It is certainly a wholesome thing to subject these beliefs to the kind of criticism which Professor Macintosh so suggestively employs. But when the original postulate of the religious object turns out to be the assumption of the actual reality of God as defined by ancient and medieval metaphysics, it can hardly be made out that such a discussion is an "empirical science"; for one of the essential characteristics of the empirical spirit is the abandonment of that particular type of metaphysical realism. Moreover, since the only means of criticizing these inherited ideas is to be found in our growing religious experience, Professor Macintosh's exposition will seem to the critical reader to be after all just a discussion of religious *ideas* in order to make them as rational as possible.

The content of this theology is purely experiential. Such terms as "revelation," "miracle," "salvation," and the like are retained, frequently in quotation marks, so as to give the familiar realistic atmosphere. But the content of religion is always discovered to be a reasonable, optimistic mysticism, whereby the religious man becomes conscious of a spiritual power active within him, enabling him to consecrate his life to the highest ideals, and to be "spiritually prepared for whatever the future may bring." This content of faith is a wholesome and frank portrayal of a characteristic type of modern Christianity, and it is set forth with reverence and with suggestiveness. But it is questionable whether the professed attempt to rescue theology from "subjectivism" may not lead to a sense of disappointment which will divert the attention of readers from the positive values of the book. The conservative, seeing the realistic historical miracles vanish, will think that the foundations are destroyed. The critical mind, seeing the retention of a God-idea constructed by outgrown metaphysics, will be only mildly interested in the theological dialectic. After all, is it not religiously as well as scientifically more satisfactory to set forth the *meaning* of religious

beliefs in the total organization of our experience than to try to reinstate realism? If the resulting theology should be classed with philosophy rather than with science, would not the true affinity of religious beliefs be indicated?

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RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF ETHICS

An interesting and valuable presentation of human conduct from the pen of a well-known writer has as its core the Morse Lectures delivered at Union Theological Seminary, New York City, early in 1919.¹ Not a little material, however, is interwoven from the author's earlier publications, together with some that has never before appeared in print. The standpoint is that of modern psychology, especially as held by the author himself, and the aim seems to be to reinterpret many traditional theological terms with the view to determine how much of the old may be retained and what one's attitude should be toward the changed and changing environment.

There are three main divisions of the book, viz., "The Correlation of Mind and Conduct," "Some Implications of the Correlation," and "Guides to Conduct." In the first part the author shows his opposition to the so-called "behaviorists" who ignore consciousness as such, and also indicates his appreciation of the psycho-analyses of the Freudians, although he himself is inclined to lay more stress upon the full, wideawake consciousness than upon any isolated, more or less "sub-attentive," complexes. In these discussions, too, he lays the basis for his detailed analyses of conduct in the later parts of the book. It is also here that he elaborates his conception of the "self" with the rather startling result that it is changing rather than fixed in its nature, as the soul has so frequently been regarded in the past.

In dealing with the "implications," our author discusses first "creativeness and ideals," both of which give evidence of "freedom," and since he extends the concept of the natural beyond its old boundaries and assumes that Nature is not so rigid as often conceived in the past, he feels justified in asserting a kind of freedom in the world. This leads to a consideration of "responsibility," which he carefully discriminates from "accountability" and identifies with "authorship." One might be insane or forgiven, and yet through authorship responsible.

¹ *Mind and Conduct*. By Henry Rutgers Marshall. New York: Scribner, 1919. x+236 pages. \$1.75.